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This paper presents and investigates foreign state compulsion as a defence in transnational 
antitrust cases. It takes a comparative approach by looking at the doctrine and its developments 
in the United States and in the European Union. To illustrate the relevance of the defence and 
the difficulties of its applicability, this paper analyses the new antitrust case law emerging in the 
US involving Chinese export cartels. It is argued that at present the standard required to prove 
compulsion is too high to serve its function. 
INTRODUCTION 
Internationally varying levels of state involvement in economic affairs mark 
international trading. This poses multiple challenges for the global regulatory 
framework, especially in such fields as competition law, which are not formalised 
through binding agreements at the multilateral level. Competition laws and policies 
while being generally consistent and self-contained domestically or regionally (as in the 
case of the European Union), lack coherence internationally. One of the weaknesses 
unveils itself in transnational cases involving or implicating foreign states. 
Fundamentally, the issue of foreign state responsibility for anticompetitive conduct in 
such a context remains largely terra incognita. It is not well addressed within the WTO 
framework, while domestic institutions seem ill-equipped to deal with it.1 From a more 
practical perspective, the availability of various state-related defences significantly limits 
the power of antitrust in such cases.2 
Foreign state compulsion is one such state-related defence, or to better reflect their 
common effect: avoidance techniques.3 It is a valid defence in antitrust cases, 
                                                                                                                                         
* Doctoral Student, Ad Astra Scholar, University College Dublin School of Law. This article is an edited part 
of a larger piece of research presented at the 18th CLaSF Workshop on 22 September 2011, drawing from M. 
Martyniszyn, ‘Avoidance Techniques: State Related Defences in International Antitrust Cases’ (CCP Working 
Paper No. 11-2, 2011). Thanks to Imelda Maher, Joseph McMahon, Spencer Weber Waller and the CLaSF 
Workshop participants for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 See, for example, DD Sokol, ‘Limiting Anti-Competitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special 
Interests’, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 119 (2009). 
2 For analysis of state-related defences available in antitrust litigation see M Martyniszyn, ‘Avoidance 
Techniques: State Related Defences in International Antitrust Cases’ (CCP Working Paper No. 11-2, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1782888; SW Waller, et al, Special Defenses in 
International Antitrust Litigation (ABA Antitrust Section, 1995). 
3 Fox used this term to refer to state immunity, act of state doctrine and non-justiciability. I argue that foreign 
state compulsion fits well into this category. Compare H Fox, ‘International Law and Restraints on the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts of States’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law 363-65 (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2006). 
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potentially fully removing liability from the party invoking it. Although widely 
recognised,4 it is a rule of domestic law, not a principle of international law. Foreign 
state compulsion is usually treated as a sui generis defence, peculiar either to the 
international context or even to the antitrust area.5 The rationale behind it is at least 
twofold and includes comity and fairness considerations.6 Comity among nations calls 
for a domestic court to give due deference to the governmental (de jure imperii) acts of a 
foreign sovereign. Fairness requires not holding an entity liable for a conduct which it 
did not undertake of its own free will. Unfortunately that is where clarity ends. Despite 
the reasonably straightforward logic behind it, the foreign state compulsion doctrine 
remains a rather poorly defined legal tool, offering little predictability in terms of 
possible outcomes in both leading competition law regimes: the US and the EU. This is 
unsatisfactory especially as strong industrial policies and state regulation in economic 
affairs are not reminiscences of the past, but still a feature of important economies, for 
example in the BRIC states.7 
This paper offers a new contribution to the extensive literature on the international 
aspects of competition laws. It aims to partly fill the existing gap by providing a 
comparative perspective on the issue of foreign state compulsion as a defence in 
antitrust cases in the US and in the EU. It also attempts to indicate the present 
contours of the defence, in light of the most recent and still emerging US case law, 
underlining the aspects of the doctrine requiring further consideration. This paper 
argues that at present the standard required to prove compulsion is set too high to 
make it a workable and reliable legal tool, serving its purpose. 
Part I of this paper presents and explores the development of the defence in the US, a 
jurisdiction which led in extraterritorial application of antitrust laws and seems to have 
first recognized this defence. Part II presents US domestic state action, a defence 
available in intra-US antitrust cases involving an action of a US state. Despite 
similarities, both doctrines use different standards, with the former being much more 
narrowly framed and being often criticised. In Part III this article analyses foreign state 
compulsion as a defence in the EU regime: the state action doctrine. Part IV looks at 
the recently emerging case law involving the issue of foreign state compulsion in the 
US. The conclusions suggest that the standard required to prove foreign state 
compulsion is set too high. An approach more in line with the US domestic state action 
                                                                                                                                         
4 For example in the US, EU, Japan, Australia, New Zealand. Compare C. Noonan, The Emerging Principles of 
International Competition Law 335-37 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
5 Waller, et al, see supra note 2, at 78. 
6 Compare Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 8:22 (West Group, 3rd ed, 1997-2010); The 
Department of Justice, The Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International 
Operations (1995), 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1707, § 3.32. 
7 BRIC is an acronym referring to the dynamically developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. It 
seems to have been introduced by O’Neill, who underscored the growing importance of BRIC in the world 
economy. Compare J O’Neill, ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’ (Goldman Sachs Global Economics 
Paper No. 66, 2001), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/brics-reports-
pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf. 
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doctrine would serve the issue of predictability better. It would also create incentives to 
look for an international forum better fitted to address such concerns. 
1. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine is recognized in the US as a defence on the 
merits in antitrust litigation. Private firms compelled by a foreign government may be 
relieved from liability for their anticompetitive conduct. The Supreme Court 
acknowledged, without further deliberations, its existence in Hardford Fire, referring to it 
as a ‘true conflict’.8 Despite rather broad recognition of this principle by the courts, 
Texaco Maracaibo9 decided in 1970 remains the only case where reliance on it was 
successful. The US authorities recognized foreign sovereign compulsion as a self-
standing legal defence only in 1988.10 
Texaco Maracaibo dealt with an alleged concerted boycott by companies exploring for 
and extracting crude oil in Venezuela, who refused to sell to the plaintiff, whose 
business was based on those deliveries. When the supplies stopped despite numerous 
efforts of the plaintiff, he brought the action for treble damages for violation of US 
antitrust law (on a refusal to deal basis). The defendants claimed that the decision to 
stop supplies was not autonomous, but forced by the Venezuelan government who 
forbade them to deal with the plaintiffs. They did not deny the refusal to deal, or the 
fact of damages. The court found in favour of defendants. 
The business of oil extraction by foreign companies was tightly-regulated in Venezuela. 
A special office (the Coordinating Commission) laid down rules regarding the sale of 
the extracted oil and supervised all the concessionaires. The sanctions for non-
compliance were severe, including a suspension of the right to export the oil. The 
Commission instructed the defendants by phone that no further deliveries were to 
reach the plaintiff, who was subsequently duly notified about the situation by the 
defendants.11 
The court held that the defendants were compelled by the authorities to boycott the 
plaintiff. More generally, it held that compulsion is a complete defence to an antitrust 
action.12 It considered its form irrelevant. In the instant case there was no special 
legislation, or written order. The fact of compulsion was established on the basis of an 
informal oral instruction.13 Moreover, responding to the argument that in cases of 
                                                                                                                                         
8 Hardford Fire Insurance Co. v California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993). For different ways of interpreting this 
statement see Waller, et al, see supra note 2, at 84-85. 
9 Interamerican Refining Corp. v Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. (Texaco Maracaibo), 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
10 The Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), 55 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, § 6. Compare ‘Report: Analysis of Department of Justice 
Guidelines- International Operations- Antitrust Enforcement Policy’, 57 Antitrust L. J. 957, 966 (1988). 
11 Texaco Maracaibo, see supra note 9, at 1294-95. 
12 Id. at 1296. 
13 Id. at 1295-96. 
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compulsion, the compelling acts must be valid under the law of the country involved, 
the court referring to the act of state doctrine and Sabbatino, held that validity is not to 
be investigated.14 It should be also pointed out that in Texaco Maracaibo the reliance on 
the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine was upheld by the court without territorial 
limitation. The defence was recognised despite the fact that Venezuelan authorities 
compelled the defendants not to deal in the US. This issue was not even raised in the 
case. 
The recognition of foreign sovereign compulsion as a defence can be traced back to the 
much earlier Sisal case,15 dealing with the monopolization of the sisal imports from 
Mexico. In this case the court held that when a private party solicited the government 
to enact the legislation that led to the private anticompetitive acts, foreign sovereign 
compulsion as a defence does not apply. The compulsion was given further recognition 
in Swiss Watchmakers,16 where the court acknowledged that the compulsion would 
remove liability from the compelled companies.17 The case dealt with state-approved 
and state-facilitated regulation of the watch-making industry, which aimed at keeping 
the know-how, machinery and watch parts in Switzerland, so as to protect the Swiss 
watch industry from potential competition. Although the regulation was recognised and 
approved by the government, it was still considered a private agreement, subject to the 
antitrust rules and the claim of foreign sovereign compulsion was not successful. 
Despite the state’s engagement, the direct foreign government action compelling the 
defendant’s activities was missing. The issue of state engagement was further clarified in 
Mannington,18 where it was held that the party asserting the defence must prove that the 
foreign state’s involvement was more than merely peripheral to the anticompetitive 
conduct involved. Therefore simple approval of the state does not meet the threshold 
necessary for the doctrine to apply. Moreover, the defence was considered not 
applicable if the defendant could have legally refused the state’s wishes.19 
                                                                                                                                         
14 Id. at 1299. 
15 United States v Sisal Sales Corporation (Sisal), 274 U.S. 268 (1927). Later Sisal was referred to in Continental Ore 
where American and Canadian companies were accused of monopolizing trade in vanadium. In this case a 
particular company was appointed by the Canadian authority as the exclusive agent responsible for vanadium 
for Canadian industry in wartime. It helped the main defendant by refusing to buy from the plaintiff. The 
defendants claimed that they should be released from liability as they acted pursuant to the orders of the 
government agency. In this respect the court relied on the Sisal authority and noted that a company violating 
antitrust rules may be held liable for its conduct, even if aided by the foreign government. In the instant case, 
the court found no evidence indicating that the government agency approved or would have approved of the 
efforts to monopolize the market. See Continental Ore Co. v Untion Carbon & Carbide Corp. (Continental Ore), 
370 U.S. 690, 705-07 (1962). 
16 United States v Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. (Swiss Watchmakers), 1963 Trade Cases (CCH) 
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
17 ‘If, of course, the defendants’ activities had been required by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing. 
An American court would have under such circumstances no right to condemn the governmental activity of 
another sovereign nation.’ id. at XLVI. 
18 Mannington Mills, Inc. v Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
19 Id. at 1293. It is worth pointing out that the defence was also recognized in various consent decrees and 
judgments settling government cases. For example in GE Incandescent Lamp it was established that the foreign 
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A major policy consideration underlying the compulsion defence is one of fairness to 
the defendant. The other rationale usually provided in this respect is the comity 
consideration.20 Fairness requires allowing the defendants to justify or excuse the 
compelled conduct, whereas comity helps determine whether the conduct is justified, 
excused or rather subject to the full range of sanctions, depending on the context.21 
Moreover, apart from those two principal considerations further grounds are suggested, 
among them the analogy to the domestic state action doctrine,22 which is important.23 
The US Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law addresses the issue of the foreign 
sovereign compulsion in section 441.24 Contrary to the court in Texaco Maracaibo it 
generally recognises the defence only when the compulsion was ‘embodied in binding 
laws or regulations subject to penal or other severe sanctions’.25 It is explicitly 
acknowledged that the defence is not available when the state’s orders are given in the 
form of guidance, informal communications, or the like. It is fair to conclude that the 
Restatement would not allow recognising compulsion in a case factually similar to 
Texaco Maracaibo, thus limiting its general availability. Moreover, the real threat of penal 
or other ‘severe sanctions’ is crucial and the danger of termination of the business, by 
revocation of the necessary license, is provided as an example thereof. The loss of 
future opportunities does not meet the standard.26 In the case of contradictory 
commands of two states, preference is given to the law of the state where the act is to 
                                                                                                                                         
defendant would not be in contempt of the judgment for doing anything outside the US which was required 
by, or for not doing anything outside the US which was unlawful under the laws where he was incorporated 
or doing business. United States v General Electric Co. (GE Incandescent Lamp), 115 F.Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 
1953). In the Oil Cartel case it was provided that not only the conduct required by foreign law would be 
exempt, but also conduct pursuant to ‘request or official pronouncement of policy’ of the foreign state 
(subject to ‘the risk of present or future loss of the particular business in the foreign state). United States v 
Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) P72,742, 72,743 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Compare Waller, et al.., see 
supra note 2, at 95-96; W.L. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and Antitrust Laws § 3.19 (Aspen Publishers, 5th ed, 
1997). 
20 Waller, et al, see supra note 2, at 79; 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 
see supra note 6, at 3.32; B.E. Hawk, ‘Special Defenses and Issues, Including Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Act 
of State Doctrine, Foreign Government Compulson and Sovereign Immunity’, 50 Antitrust L. J. 562, 571 
(1981). 
21 Waller, et al, see supra note 2, at 81. 
22 Id. at 79. 
23 See infra Part 2, at p 151. Some scholars claim that recognizing the fairness rationale of the foreign state 
compulsion implies finding its origin in the state action doctrine. See J Leidig, ‘The Uncertain Status of the 
Defense of Foreign Sovereign Compulsion: Two Proposals for Change’, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 321, 328 (1991). 
24 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third): Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 441 
(American Law Institute Publishers, 1987): 
 (1) In general, a state may not require a person (a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law 
of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national; or (b) to refrain from doing an act in another 
state that is required by the law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national. 
 (2) In general, a state may require a person of foreign nationality (a) to do an act in that state even if it is 
prohibited by the law of the state of which he is a national; or (b) to refrain from doing an act in that state 
even if it is required by the law of the state of which he is a national.  
25 Id. at § 441 cmt. c. 
26 Id. at § 441 cmt. c, n. 3. 
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be performed.27 At the same time, in cases where the conduct at stake has direct effects 
in both the territorial state and the state of nationality, the preference is not as strong.28 
Similar to the Restatement,29 the 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines of the DOJ 
and FTC30 consider the threat of penal or other severe sanctions indispensable for the 
applicability of the compulsion defence. The issue of the form of compulsion is not 
discussed, therefore it may be that informal pressure suffices. However measures short 
of compulsion will not be able to fall within the scope of the defence.31 No strict limits 
are recognised with respect to territorial reach of the doctrine, nevertheless it is clarified 
that the defence is available ‘normally only’ in cases, where the compelled conduct was 
accomplished ‘entirely’ within the compelling state’s territory.32 It is pointed out that in 
cases, where the conduct occurs in the US, the defence is not available. The Guidelines 
also clarify that the defence does not apply in cases falling within the Foreign State 
Immunities Act’s commercial activity exception.33 Therefore, it is considered that the 
defence is not applicable to the commercial dealings of a state. 
As Crampton34 points out the Guidelines narrowed down the applicability of the 
doctrine in comparison with the Guidelines issued in 1988.35 The older document did 
not talk about sanctions but ‘the imposition of significant penalties or to the denial of 
specific substantial benefits’.36 Moreover, the 1988 Guidelines noted that the defence 
will not be generally available if the conduct took place wholly or primarily in the US.37 
The compulsion defence is weakened when so-called blocking statutes are involved,38 
i.e. legislation prohibiting providing foreign authorities with documents and 
information, subject to sanctions, when this would impair home state essential 
                                                                                                                                         
27 Id. at § 441 cmt. a. 
28 Id. at § 441 cmt. b. 
29 Comparing these documents one should keep in mind that the Restatements, however extremely influential 
in practice, are the effect of a private codification of law in particular fields (de lege lata) undertaken by the 
American Law Institute, whereas the DOJ and FTC Guidelines express the view of the government agencies 
on the matter. For more on the Restatements see http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.main. 
30 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, see supra note 6, at § 3.32, 2. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at § 3.32, 3. 
33 Id. Compare Waller, see supra note 6, at § 8:25. 
34 PS Crampton, ‘The 1995 US Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations: A Foreign 
Perspective’, 1 IBLJ 99, 103-04 (1996). For analysis of the 1988 Guidelines see ‘Report: Analysis of 
Department of Justice Guidelines- International Operations- Antitrust Enforcement Policy’, see supra note 
10, at 996-98. 
35 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, see supra note 10. 
36 Id. at § 6, 2. 
37 Id. at § 6, 3. 
38 SW Waller, ‘Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The Japanese Auto 
Restraints and Beyond’, 14 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 747, 780-81 (1982). 
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interests.39 The Restatement notes that while the compulsion generally entitles the 
defendant to be completely freed from liability, when blocking statutes are involved ‘a 
variety of adverse inferences are permissible’ and the statutes ‘need not be given the 
same deference (…) as differences in substantive rules of law.’40 Waller points out that 
blocking statutes constitute a form of negative compulsion, and are ‘usually not geared 
to advancing any affirmative policy’ of a foreign state.41 Such restrictions are in any case 
not absolute. The efforts of a defendant to secure, domestically, permission to comply 
with foreign discovery orders will in practice play a role.42 The courts are likely to 
engage in a balancing exercise in cases raising this issue.43 
It is worth noting that in the early eighties, the US car industry faced a significant crisis, 
unable to cope with the import competition, especially from Japanese cars. This led to 
the introduction of a system of oversight and reporting by the Japanese authorities so 
as to limit exports. The issue of possible application of US antitrust was identified at 
the very onset by both governments as a possible obstacle to the approach of 
addressing the problem.44 Japanese authorities unilaterally set export quotas for 
individual companies, by means of de jure non-binding directives, and imposed a 
reporting obligation to monitor exports. In case of non-adherence with the policy the 
Japanese government intended to introduce export licensing, subject to fines, penalties 
and other sanctions.45 The US Attorney General in its answer to the Japanese letter on 
the matter provided that the DOJ considered that the adopted measures did not give 
rise to the violation of US antitrust laws, as the companies compliance with the export 
limitations were compelled by the Japanese governments, acting within its sovereign 
powers.46 The DOJ assurance was rather surprising, especially taking into consideration 
that the sanctions for noncompliance with the Japanese scheme were only promised to be 
introduced if the issue arose.47 This last issue of the form by which the compulsion is 
achieved is of practical importance. As Waller puts it, ‘to put a premium on the form 
                                                                                                                                         
39 Blocking statutes were enacted in many countries in response to the expansive extraterritorial application of 
US antitrust. Compare RE Price, ‘Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GATT: State Sovereignty and the 
Enforcement of the US Economic Laws Abroad’, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 315 (1994). 
40 American Law Institute, see supra note 24, at § 442, n. 5. 
41 Waller, see supra note 38, at 780-81. 
42 American Law Institute, see supra note 24, at § 442, n. 5. Compare In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1977). 
43 American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Obtaining Discovery Abroad 61-62 (ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law, 2nd ed, 2005). 
44 For an in-depth analysis of this case in the broader trade context and with the special regard to the foreign 
state compulsion as a defence in antitrust see Waller, see supra note 38. 
45 ‘Correspondence Between the U.S. Attorney General and Ambassador of Japan on U.S. Antitrust Laws and 
Japan’s Restraints on Automobile Exports’, reprinted in U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) (May 13, 1981), at M-1. 
46 Opinion of the United States Attorney General Addressed to Ambassador Yoshio Okawara of Japan (May 7, 
1981), 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,998. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), No. 83-2004 (U.S. Jun. 17, 
1985). 
47 Compare Waller, see supra note 38, at 812. 
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rather than on the degree of government involvement is to ignore the realities of a 
complex business world’.48 This is particularly so as the way the compulsion is framed 
may reflect different styles of governing, rather than the actual involvement of a 
particular state.49 
The issue of the foreign state compulsion was also raised in Matsushita, another case 
involving Japanese defendants: TV manufacturers were accused of price fixing and 
market allocation. The defendants alleged that the unlawful conduct was compelled by 
the Japanese authorities, as a part of its trade policy. While the district court did not 
address this issue after finding that the plaintiffs lacked the required injury for standing, 
the Court of Appeals noted that ‘a government-mandated export cartel arrangement 
fixing minimum export prices would be outside the ambit of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act’,50 yet it remained unconvinced that the conduct at stake was government-
mandated. It inter alia observed that it was possible that the Japanese government 
provided just ‘an umbrella under which the defendants gained an exemption from 
Japanese antitrust law’, and then subsequently fixed prices themselves.51 It also found 
no evidence supporting the claim that other aspects of the conduct at stake, regarding 
market allocation, originated within the Japanese authorities.52 
The decision of the Third Circuit met with criticism. Not only did the Japanese 
government, in a diplomatic note, in a straightforward way underline and explain its 
compulsion, but for some the evidence itself suggested likewise.53 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. In its amicus submission the Japanese government supported the 
defendants, stating that the measures at stake ‘came into existence pursuant of the 
direction of the Government of Japan (…) and constituted an integral aspect of [its] 
foreign economic and trade policy.’54 The US government in its brief supported this 
position. It recognised, in general, that ‘anticompetitive private conduct should not lead 
to liability in a private antitrust suit when that conduct is directed by a foreign 
sovereign.’55 It advised that the Japanese statement should be accepted ‘at face value; 
government’s assertions concerning the existence and meaning of its domestic law 
generally should be deemed “conclusive.”’56 The Supreme Court did not, unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                                         
48 Id. at 794. 
49 Compare Waller, see supra note 6, at § 8:19, n. 6. 
50 In re Japanese Elec. Prods Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3th Cir. 1983). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See, for example, JW Perkins, ‘In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation: Sovereign 
Compulsion, Act of State, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Antitrust Laws’, 36 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 721, 757-60 (1986). 
54 Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for A Writ of Certiorari, 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), No. 83-2004, 3 (U.S. Jul. 6, 1984). 
55 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), see supra note 46, at 16. 
56 Id. at 23. The support of the US reflected the change in its foreign policy and the outcome of the 
intergovernmental negotiations with Japan. Compare A. Ganjaei, ‘Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. 
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address the issue of compulsion after establishing that the alleged conduct did not 
cause injury to the plaintiffs.57 
2. US DOMESTIC STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
The state action doctrine58 is a defence available in US domestic antitrust cases for 
private anticompetitive conduct that was undertaken pursuant to and under supervision 
of a state of the US, as well as the conduct compelled by a state. It was recognised by 
the Supreme Court in Parker (therefore it is sometimes called the Parker doctrine), 
where it observed that ‘(t)here is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in 
the Act’s legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as the 
Sherman Act declared that it prevented only “business combinations.”’59 The Parker 
doctrine holds that anticompetitive action by state governments and private conduct in 
compliance with it are immune from the liability under the Sherman Act. 
In Parker the issue at stake was a Californian state-established regulatory scheme fixing 
prices of raisins. The case was brought by a producer who wanted to sell more raisins 
and at lower prices. While the Court found that the scheme, imposed by the state in its 
legislative authority and enforced with penal sanctions, was not prohibited under the 
Sherman Act, it also observed that ‘a state does not give immunity to those who violate 
the Sherman Act by authorising them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is 
lawful.’60 The doctrine was further clarified in Midcal,61 where the Court introduced a 
two-prong test for private parties immunity under the state action doctrine: ‘first, the 
challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state 
policy; second, the policy must be actively supervised by the State itself.’62 The case at 
stake concerned a Californian retail price maintenance scheme for wines, which while 
satisfying the first prong of the test, failed the second. Although the policy was clearly 
articulated, the state did not establish prices, review their reasonableness, or engage in 
any further examination of the program.63 
The DOJ’s Antitrust Division disagreed with the American Bar Association on the 
point whether the state action doctrine should be made applicable internationally, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                         
Zenith Radio Corp.: The Death Knell for Predatory Price Fixing and the Avoidance of a Standard for the 
Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Defense’, 15 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 395, 407-08 (1986). 
57 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986). 
58 For more details on the US domestic state action doctrine see S. Semeraro, ‘Demystifying Antitrust State 
Action Doctrine’, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 203 (2000); J.E. Lopatka and W.H. Page, ‘State Action and the 
Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints’, 20 Yale J. on Reg. 269 
(2003). Compare the ABA Antitrust Section ‘Committee Resources’ at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/ 
at-committees/at-exemc/main-exemptions/state-action.shtml. 
59 Parker v Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
60 Id. at 351-52. 
61 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
62 Id. at 105. 
63 Id. at 105-06. 
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‘foreign government-regulated conduct’, ergo the actions of foreign states and the 
private conduct pursuant to such actions and supervision of a foreign state. The ABA 
was in favour of such a solution. In its Report on the 1988 Draft Guidelines the ABA 
similar to the court in Parker found nothing in the legislative history of the Sherman 
Act indicating that it should apply to foreign government-regulated conduct. Moreover, 
it was pointed out that ‘(s)overeign foreign states, entitled as a matter of international 
law to equal status with the United States federal government, deserve at least as much 
respect for their regulatory actions as semi-sovereign states within our federal system.’64 
In the final version of the 1988 Guidelines the DOJ did not share this logic and 
considered application of the state action doctrine inappropriate in international cases, 
citing the federalist concepts behind it and difficulties in applying such a standard in an 
international context.65 The ABA in response noted that its comments ‘appear to have 
fallen on deaf ears’.66 The 1995 Guidelines mention the doctrine only briefly in a 
footnote, distinguishing it from foreign sovereign compulsion. Yet, this distinction is 
somewhat ambiguous and not particularly enlightening: ‘(t)he state action doctrine 
applies not just to the actions of states and their subdivisions, but also to private 
anticompetitive conduct that is both undertaken pursuant to clearly articulated state 
policies, and is actively supervised by the state.’67  
Were the Parker doctrine available also in cases involving foreign states and foreign 
companies, it would systematically solve a number of issues. First of all, it does not 
require compulsion as such to remove liability from private companies acting in 
accordance with a state prescription. Generally speaking it is sufficient that they act 
pursuant to a clearly established policy of a state, under its supervision. This is 
significantly less demanding standard to meet and it has the potential to better 
accommodate foreign regulatory frameworks where the role of formal law differs from 
the role it plays in free-market-economy jurisdictions. Particularly, it seems better 
equipped to handle regimes with more both direct and indirect state involvement in 
economic affairs. Making the state action doctrine available in the international context 
would bring more transparency into US antitrust. It would, arguably, contribute to 
development of the international trade law in this area, as parties affected by 
anticompetitive conduct unable to bring private actions in US courts would most 
probably lobby the US government to bring more actions in the WTO. Furthermore, it 
would also answer in the negative the outstanding question concerning the possibility 
                                                                                                                                         
64 ABA Section of Antitrust Law & Section of International Trade and Practice, ‘Report to the House of 
Delegates [on Draft Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations]’, 57 Antitrust L. J. 651, 668-69 (1988). 
65 ‘(…) Given the complexity and novelty of foreign legal systems and the difficulty of obtaining foreign-
located evidence, defendants would have many opportunities to attempt to evade legitimate application of 
the U.S. antitrust laws wherever there was an arguable foreign national policy underlying anticompetitive 
conduct. The use of an active supervision standard of the sort applied in state action cases would also require 
difficult inquiries into the foreign sovereign’s conduct of its own affairs.’ 1988 Antitrust Enforcement 
Guidelines for International Operations, see supra note 10, at § 6, 4, n. 179. 
66 Compare ‘Report: Analysis of Department of Justice Guidelines- International Operations- Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy’, see supra note 10, at 967-68. 
67 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, see supra note 6, at n. 93. 
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of an antitrust suit in the US court against a foreign sovereign. This itself would be a 
very welcome development from the perspective of international relations and it seems, 
in light of its recent position in RPP, that the DOJ is in favour of settling sensitive 
transnational commercial disputes involving a foreign state, and not falling under the 
WTO regime, through international negotiations rather than in the courtrooms in the 
US.68 Were the state action doctrine made applicable in an international context in 
antitrust cases, the avoidance doctrines would become largely irrelevant in this field. 
It is worth noting that there may be parallels also between the US state action doctrine 
and the EU foreign sovereign defence known also under the state action doctrine 
name. The latter seems to apply also in situations where the regulatory framework in a 
particular state eliminates the competition. 
3. THE COMPULSION IN THE EU: THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
In the EU context the European Commission and the Court of Justice recognised the 
foreign state compulsion as a defence, narrowly applied, in cases where companies were 
left with no margin of freedom for autonomous action allowing for competition. The 
terminology in this case is different than in the discourse in international law, as the 
defence is called the state action doctrine.69 In most cases it was recognised as a 
jurisdictional rule. Although it was raised mostly in the intra-EU context, there is no 
reason why it could not be relied on by a non-EU company, in the case of 
extraterritorial application of EU competition law. In scenarios where no autonomous 
conduct can be found on the part of the undertakings involved in anticompetitive 
conduct, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU do not apply.70 No distinction is drawn between 
private and public undertakings. What matters is the presence or the lack of the 
autonomous conduct on their side. In the latter case, when Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
are inapplicable, in the EU context a member state compelling companies to act in an 
anticompetitive manner could be found in breach of its obligations under the TFEU.71 
                                                                                                                                         
68 In this case, brought by US gasoline retailers against various producers of refined petroleum products for 
price-fixing of crude oil and refined petroleum products in conspiracy with OPEC, the US government in its 
amicus submission supported the defendants and argued that the case raised non-justiciable political questions 
ousting the jurisdiction of the court. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, 
Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 09-20084 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). Compare 
Martyniszyn, see supra note 2, at 11-12. 
69 Compare: OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement- Roundtable on the Application of Antitrust 
Law to State-Owned Enterprises- European Commission, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2009) 42, 11-14 (Sept. 28, 2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/antitrustlaw.pdf. 
70 For the sake of clarity I consistently refer to the EU competition provisions under their current numbering. 
71 The EU member states undertook an obligation under Art. 4(3) TEU (so-called ‘loyalty clause’) to facilitate 
the achievement of the Union’s tasks. This provision prohibits EU member states to take any measures 
jeopardizing such endeavours, and read in conjunction with the Protocol 27 on the Internal Market and 
Competition, annexed to TEU and TFEU (providing that EU ‘includes a system ensuring that competition is 
not distorted’), and with the substantive provisions of Article 101 and 102, offers additional basis for 
challenging anticompetitive measures, including legislation, of a EU member state. Yet this route has only 
been used once to date. See Case C-35/96, Commission v Italy, [1998] ECR I-3851. Pace identifies four types 
of scenarios in which the EU member state could be found in breach of Article 101 read in conjunction with 
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If the compelling state is not a member of the EU, the situation is more complicated 
and EU law seems not to offer a remedy. 
Ladbroke Racing72 was the first case when the Court of Justice clarified the position of 
the EU competition law on the issue of compulsion. It noted that the core EU 
competition law provisions, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, apply only to anticompetitive 
conduct of undertakings carried out on their own initiative. The court expressly noted 
that if the conduct is required by legislation, or if the legislation creates a legal 
framework eliminating competition on the part of the undertakings, then the 
restrictions of competition are not attributable to the undertakings.73 
Van Bael suggests that compulsion as a defence had been already recognised by the 
Commission with respect to voluntary restraint agreements.74 The Commission noted 
that Article 101 does not apply to export agreements imposed on firms in non-member 
states by their governments, apart from scenarios when there was an agreement or 
concerted practice among firms independent thereof. At the same time, it was 
underlined that Article 101 applies in cases when the government only authorised the 
export agreements, ergo does not force their creation.75 In its decision in Ball-Bearings,76 
the Commission explicitly recognised that the state (in this case a non-EU member 
state) compulsion removed the measures outside the scope of applicability of the 
prohibition, which still remained applicable to any anticompetitive measures undertaken 
by the companies themselves, on top of the compelled conduct.77 It also again pointed 
out that the mere authorisation of the conduct by state authorities does not make the 
provisions of Article 101 inapplicable.78 Similarly, in its decision in Aluminium Imports79 
the Commission noted that even if a government supported a contract in violation of 
                                                                                                                                         
the loyalty clause. This would happen when a state would (a) require adoption of anticompetitive agreement 
(compel them), (b) reinforce their effects, (c) encourage/ favour their adoption, (d) deprive ‘its own rules of 
the character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility for their decisions 
affecting the economic sphere’. L.F. Pace, European Antitrust Law: Prohibitions, Merger Control and Procedures 157-
58 (Edward Elgar, 2007). 
72 Joined cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P, Commission of the European Communities and French Republic v Ladbroke 
Racing Ltd. (Ladbroke Racing), [1997] ECR I-6265. 
73 Id. at 33. 
74 I. Van Bael and Van Bael & Bellis (eds), Competition Law of the European Community 48 (Kluwer Law 
International, 5th ed, 2010). 
75 European Commission, Third Report on Competition Policy 27, 20, n. 3 (Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 1974). 
76 Decision 74/634/EEC of the Commission, of 29 November 1974, IV/27.095, Ball-Bearings, OJ L 343, 19 
(Dec. 21, 1974). 
77 Id. at 23, § II, 1(b). 
78 Id. at 23, § II, 1(c). 
79 Decision 85/206/EEC of the Commission, of 19 December 1984, IV/26.870, Aluminium Imports from Eastern 
Europe (Aluminium Imports), OJ L 92, 1 (Mar. 30, 1985). 
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the competition law, this does not alter the position of the companies involved, 
therefore it is not a valid defence.80 
If a state supports, encourages, or in any other way tries to convince an undertaking to 
engage in an anticompetitive conduct, the latter is left with no defence. In a similar vein 
in Wood Pulp81 a US export cartel attempted to rely on such a defence, claiming that it 
was a duly registered and officially recognized export association. The court noted that 
the US legislation (the Webb Pomerene Act) only exempts export cartels from the 
scope of application of US antitrust, but does not require their creation.82 
To be recognized as a defence state compulsion does not have to be achieved by formal 
law. In Asia Motors III83 the court recognised that even in the absence of any binding 
regulatory provisions imposing the conduct in question, Article 101 will not be 
applicable if the conduct was unilaterally imposed by the authorities through the 
exercise of ‘irresistible pressure’.84 The term was not defined by the court, but it was 
illustrated by a threat to adopt measures likely to cause substantial losses for the 
undertaking involved. This needs to be proven on the basis of objective, relevant and 
consistent evidence.85 
The lack of evidence to support the allegation of compulsion was an issue in Stichting 
Sigarettenindustrie.86 The case dealt with various anticompetitive agreements in the 
tobacco business in the Netherlands. The applicants claimed that the Dutch authorities 
‘decisively influenced’ the agreements and that they threatened to take otherwise 
unspecified ‘measures’ in case the applicants conduct did not comply with 
expectations.87 Yet this claim was not supported by any evidence. The Commission was 
of the view that the documents available did not show that the agreements at stake 
were concluded ‘with the approval or at the instigation’ of the Netherlands, who denied 
such an allegation. The court established that the authorities held meetings with the 
undertakings involved and, in this forum, they were to ‘[indicate] certain objectives they 
wished to see achieved’.88 Yet, there was no evidence proving that the ‘objectives’ were 
to be achieved by the conclusion of the anticompetitive agreements found in violation 
of the competition law.89  
                                                                                                                                         
80 Id. at 10, 10.1, 10.2. 
81 Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission of the 
European Communities (Wood Pulp), [1988] ECR 5193. 
82 Id. at 20. 
83 Case T-387/94, Asia Motor France SA and others v Commission of the European Communities (Asia Motor III), 
[1996] ECR II-961. 
84 Id. at 65. 
85 Id. at 61-65. 
86 Joined cases 240, 241, 242, 261, 262, 268 and 269/82, Stichting Sigarettenindustrie and others v Commission of the 
European Communities (Stichting Sigarettenindustrie), [1985] ECR 3831. 
87 Id. at 38. 
88 Id. at 40. 
89 Id. 
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The exclusions from the scope of the applicability of Article 101 apply restrictively.90 
Therefore, if despite the existence of national legislation or other state-driven means 
severely limiting competition, there is still scope for effective competition the 
provisions of Article 101 apply. This issue was raised in Strintzis Lines.91 The 
Commission fined shipping companies operating ferry services between Greece and 
Italy, after finding infringement of Article 101. The applicants claimed inter alia that the 
legislative and regulatory framework as well as the official policy decisively restricted 
their autonomy, by obliging them to contact each other to consult and negotiate the 
crucial parameters of their policy, including prices.92 The court recalled that Articles 101 
and 102 apply only to anticompetitive conduct engaged in by an undertaking on their 
own initiative,93 and it found that the companies enjoyed autonomy, and were therefore 
subject to the rules on competition.94 It also reaffirmed, referring inter alia to Ladbroke 
Racing, that if the conduct at stake was required by the national legislation, or if a legal 
framework was such as to eliminate any possibility of competition, then Articles 101 
and 102 do not apply.95 Similarly, findings from Asia Motors III (irresistible pressure 
notion) were reaffirmed.96 In the instant case the question was whether the cumulative 
effect of the regulatory framework and the state policy ‘robbed’ the parties involved of 
their autonomy in adopting a tariff policy on the investigated routes, removing any 
possibility of competition between them.97 The court answered in the negative, finding 
that the undertakings enjoyed autonomy in setting pricing policy, and that there was no 
‘irresistible pressure’ forcing them to conclude tariff agreements.98 
In CIF the Court of Justice suggested different underpinnings of the doctrine.99 Here 
the Italian consortium of match manufacturers, called into existence by domestic 
legislation, allocated production quotas among companies. The price itself was fixed by 
the state. Membership of the consortium was obligatory for all producers. The Italian 
competition authority found the legislation in breach of Article 101 read in conjunction 
with the loyalty clause. It also established that the consortium itself and its members 
infringed Article 101. The court distinguished here two periods of time: until the 
membership in the consortium was obligatory, and after it became voluntary. So long as 
it was obligatory and the legislation prevented companies from engaging in 
autonomous conduct, the principle of legal certainty was not to be violated and the 
                                                                                                                                         
90 Joined cases 209 to 215, 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck SARL and others v Commission of the European Communities 
(Van Landewyck), [1980] ECR 3125, 130, 33. 
91 Case T-65/99, Strintzis Lines Shipping SA v Commission of the European Communities (Strintzis Lines), [2003] ECR 
II-5433. 
92 Id. at 123. 
93 Id. at 119. 
94 Id. at 135. 
95 Id. at 119. 
96 Id. at 122. 
97 Id. at 124. 
98 Id. at 138-41. 
99 Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF), [2003] ECR 1-8055. 
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companies cannot be exposed to any penalties for their past conduct, which was 
required by the law concerned.100 Therefore it was not a lack of infringement, ergo 
inapplicability of Article 101, as in the earlier case law, but in fact the principle of legal 
certainty that shielded defendants.101 The court also recognised that the national 
competition authority has a duty to disapply the anticompetitive law. Once such a 
decision is taken, it is binding upon the companies, who stop being shielded and their 
future conduct is liable to be penalised.102 Moreover, the court underlined that the 
defence is not applicable when the legislation merely encourages or makes it easier to 
engage in anticompetitive conduct,103 yet it may be a mitigating factor at the penalty-
setting stage.104 
Recently in Deutsche Telekom the court noted, referring to Ladbroke, that when 
anticompetitive conduct is required by a state, or if a state eliminates any possibility for 
competition among undertakings, Articles 101 and 102 do not apply, as the restriction 
of competition is not attributable to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings 
involved.105 It pointed out that ‘the possibility of excluding anticompetitive conduct 
from the scope of Articles [101 and 102] on the ground that it has been required (…) 
by existing national legislation or that the legislation has precluded all scope for any 
competitive conduct on their part has thus been accepted only to a limited extent by 
the Court of Justice.’106 Therefore it seems clarity is missing whether the court 
considers Articles 101 and 102 inapplicable in case of state compulsion, or if it 
considers it a defence shielding the undertakings involved from liability, as it suggested 
in CIF. 
As de la Torre points out it is unclear what are the consequences of the defence in case 
of actions for damages.107 In CIF the court pointed out that the companies acting under 
such compulsion are shielded from ‘all the consequences of an infringement (…) vis-a-
vis public authorities and other economic operators [emphasis added]’,108 yet in the preceding 
paragraph the court mentioned only ‘any penalties, either criminal or administrative’.109 
At the same time, if the companies are shielded from damages, in the intra-EU context 
it is possible to bring an action for damages against a state, under the Francovich 
                                                                                                                                         
100 Id. at 53. 
101 Compare F.C. de la Torre, ‘State Action Defence in EC Competition Law’, 28 World Competition 407, 417 
(2005); Pace, see supra note 71, at 166-67. 
102 CIF, see supra note 99, at 54-55. 
103 Id. at 56. 
104 Id. at 57. 
105 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, [2010] ECR 0000, 80. 
106 Id. at 81, referring inter alia to Stichting Sigarettenindustrie and CIF.  
107 de la Torre, see supra note 101, at 419. 
108 CIF, see supra note 99, at 54. 
109 Id. at 53. 
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principle.110 It provides for a member state liability for losses caused to private parties 
as a result of a violation of EU law for which the state is responsible. 
The EU state action doctrine can be seen either as a jurisdictional rule, rendering 
Articles 101 and 102 inapplicable to anticompetitive conduct compelled by a state, or as 
a defence on merits. It potentially fully frees undertakings from liability. It is applicable 
to explicit compulsion, as well as to scenarios when the state leaves companies no room 
for competitive conduct. This can be achieved explicitly through legislation, or by less 
legally obvious but similarly compelling means, where a state places an ‘irresistible 
pressure’ on the party to act in an anticompetitive way, under the threat of substantial 
losses, or other serious, but not necessarily penal sanctions. Compared to the US 
doctrines of foreign state compulsion and domestic state action, the EU state action 
doctrine seems to be less demanding than the former (for example, by not requiring 
such a presence of such a severe sanctions for non-compliance), but stricter than the 
latter (by, for example, requiring the parties to show that they were left with no margin 
for autonomous competitive conduct). 
4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE US111 
The recent line of US case law involving Chinese export cartels heralds a revival of the 
reliance on the foreign state compulsion defence, the contours of which are not well 
defined. These new cases together with the related trade dispute within the WTO show 
that the law in this area calls for further clarification, leading potentially to better 
identification of liability for anticompetitive conduct. China, due to its economic and 
legal systems and its increasing importance in international trade provides new, legally 
challenging scenarios. One practitioner bluntly characterised any possible successful 
reliance by Chinese cartelists on foreign state compulsion defence as ‘a declaration of 
war on the market system.’112 
The foreign compulsion defence was recently invoked in Vitamin C.113 Four Chinese 
manufacturers and their trade association were accused by US purchasers of fixing 
prices and limiting exports, ergo creation of an export cartel. The allegations themselves 
were not challenged. Instead, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss the case, 
                                                                                                                                         
110 See TC Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law 248-55 (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2010); A 
Kaczorowska, European Union Law 365-84 (Routledge-Cavendish, 2nd ed, 2010). In a scenario when the 
companies are found in breach of competition law for limiting the competition further than required by the 
compelling legislation, it may be difficult, in terms of damages, to distinguish between theirs and the state 
responsibility. Compare de la Torre, see supra note 101, at 425. 
111 This part draws on another text, where these recent developments are discussed in the context of export 
cartels. See M Martyniszyn, ‘Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of 
Recent Case Law’, (2012) 15(1) J. Int’l Econ. L. 181. 
112 See A Longstreth, ‘U.S. Courts Confront China’s Involvement in Price Fixing’, Reuters Legal (Mar. 11, 2011), 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/11/us-china-vitaminc-idUSTRE72A4XH20110311. 
113 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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arguing that they their conduct was compelled by the Chinese authorities.114 At an early 
stage the defendants’ motion was denied as the court found the evidence too 
ambiguous.115 
The Chinese government placed considerable importance on the case and submitted its 
first ever amicus brief in front of a US court.116 In the brief the Chinese authorities 
argued that the trade association (the Chamber of Commerce) operated under its direct 
and active supervision, fulfilling governmental functions. In 1997 China introduced a 
system of strict control of vitamin C production, carried by a specially created body in 
the Chamber. The right to export vitamin C was limited solely to its members. They 
were obliged to ‘voluntarily adjust their production outputs’ and to ‘strictly execute [an] 
export coordinated price set by the Chamber and [to] keep it confidential’, under a 
threat of revocation of the membership or ultimately cancellation of the export license. 
The Chinese defendants backed by the authorities claimed that they were compelled to 
export at a set price, and even though the price itself was not set by the authorities they 
were unable to export at a non-conforming price.117  
The court considered that the Chinese submission was entitled to substantial deference, 
but it was not to be regarded as conclusive evidence on compulsion, especially as it was 
directly contradicted by the documentary evidence.118 The plaintiffs argued that there 
was no law or regulation compelling a price or price agreement at issue. The evidence 
demonstrated that the defendants at least once set the price by hand voting during a 
meeting. Moreover, it was argued that despite setting the minimum price, the 
defendants were undercutting each other.119 This part of the evidence suggested a 
complex interplay between the defendants and the involved institutions, clouding the 
degree of their independence with respect to price decisions.120 
As the court noted, in contrast to cases like Texaco Maracaibo, in this case the parties 
contested both the origin and the very fact of compulsion. Because of the non-
transparent Chinese legal system, commonly relying on ministerial regulations, it was 
unclear ‘whether defendants were performing governmental function, whether they 
were acting as private citizens pursuant to governmental directives or whether they 
were acting as unrestrained private citizens’.121 Moreover, the court observed that a 
situation in which the defendants first formed the cartel and thereafter asked for the 
state recognition was also conceivable, but it refrained from commenting on the 
                                                                                                                                         
114 The defendants invoked also other state-related defences, such as the act of state and international comity, 
but the core of the defence rested on claim that the Chinese government required them to fix prices id. at 
550-52. 
115 Id. at 559. 
116 Id. at 552. 
117 Id. at 552-54. 
118 Id. at 557. 
119 Id. at 555. 
120 Id. at 556. 
121 Id. at 559. 
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availability of the defences raised in this case. Ultimately, the records were considered 
too ambiguous ‘to foreclose further inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants' 
actions’ and the motion to dismiss was denied.122 
After further discovery the district court, in a well-crafted 72-page opinion, denied the 
defendants a motion for summary judgment based on the foreign compulsion 
defence.123 It recognised that the defence124 is applicable when a foreign party is placed 
‘between the rock of its own local law and the hard place of U.S. law’, yet it found ‘no 
rock and no hard place’, ergo no compulsion, in the instant case.125 In general terms, it 
noted that the defence applies only when the refusal to comply would lead to ‘the 
imposition of penal or other severe sanctions’,126 and in any case it does not cover 
conduct ‘going beyond what the foreign sovereign compelled’.127 The court found the 
defence non-applicable in cases, where the compulsion was procured by the 
defendant.128 It disagreed with the court in Animal Science129 which found the foreign 
sovereign compulsion defence applicable if the defendants were compelled to abide 
with the set minimum prices, considering it irrelevant how the minimum prices came 
about.130 The Vitamin C court noted that if the defendants in Animal Science were not 
compelled to reach minimum price agreements in the first place, the fact that such 
agreements were enforced would not suffice to make the foreign state compulsion 
defence applicable.131 Furthermore, although not dispositive the compulsion seems 
unlikely in a scenario, like in the instant case, when ‘defendants enthusiastically embrace 
a legal regime that encourages, or even ‘compels,’ a lucrative cartel that is in their self-
interest.’132 
As the case developed it transpired that the earlier Chinese regulatory framework 
changed significantly in 2002 (the case concerned conduct between December 2001 
and December 2008). The membership in the relevant Chamber’s body became 
voluntary and it was no longer necessary in order to export.133 Thus, the sanctions for 
                                                                                                                                         
122 Id. The court dismissed the complaint with a leave to replead. The plaintiffs added new defendants in a 
second amended complaint and they were offered an opportunity to make allegations against them. 
123 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, No. 06-MD-1738 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2011). 
124 The defendants raised also the doctrines of the act of state and the international comity, but the court found 
that these claims were in essence dependent on the establishment the compulsion in the instant case. Id. at 
33-34, 39-42. 
125 Id. at 2. 
126 Id. at 35, citing 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, see supra note 6, at § 
3.32, 2. 
127 Vitamin C Ib, see supra note 123, at 35, citing Waller, see supra note 6, at § 8:23, n. 6. 
128 Vitamin C Ib, see supra note 123, at 41, n. 33. 
129 For discussion of this case see infra notes 148-166 and the accompanying text. 
130 Vitamin C Ib, see supra note 123, at 36. See infra note 154 and the accompanying text. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 41, n. 33, 46-47. The court called coercion in such a context a ‘paper tiger’, borrowing a Mao Tse-Tung 
metaphor. 
133 Id. at 11-12. 
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noncompliance altered: the termination of the membership under the new regime 
played a different role as it was not indispensible for the sake of exportation.134 In fact 
it seems there were no penalties for failing to follow the new ‘self-discipline’ system.135 
Moreover, in 2004 one of the cartel members deflected and refused to participate in a 
planned production stoppage and, as the other cartel member general manager 
described it ‘unilaterally tore[d] up the agreement [on the shutdown]’.136 When the 
cartel scheduled another stoppage, it considered the chances of the previously 
deflecting member partaking as ‘not great’.137 Although it was argued that the deflecting 
company was penalised for its behaviour and forced to participate in the next 
shutdown, the court did not find any documentary evidence supporting these claims.138 
The court refused to defer to the Chinese authorities interpretation of Chinese law, 
particularly in its 2009 statement.139 The court noted it did not ‘read like a frank and 
straightforward explanation of Chinese law’ but rather ‘a carefully crafted and phrased 
litigation position.’140 Besides, China’s position was contradicted both by the factual 
record141 and by China’s representations to the WTO.142 The court reached a 
conclusion that China’s assertion of compulsion was ‘a post-hoc attempt to shield 
defendants’ conduct from antitrust scrutiny.’143 
The court referred also to the on-going WTO trade dispute in a similar context (China 
is accused of introducing minimum price requirements for certain raw materials), where 
the panel found that the actions undertaken by the relevant Chamber of Commerce 
(setting and coordination of export prices) were attributable to China.144 The court did 
not find its interpretations of Chinese law altered by the panel’s findings, especially as 
the only regulation possibly indicating compulsion concerned only the minimum price 
requirement so as to avoid the below-cost pricing and related anti-dumping challenges, 
and it was itself not relied upon by the Chinese authorities to establish compulsion in 
the instant case.145 
                                                                                                                                         
134 Id. at 12, 55. 
135 Id. at 53-55. 
136 Id. at 12. 
137 Id. at 22-23. In the end the latter joined, but allegedly due to its own technical problems. Id. at 23. 
138 Id. at 23-24, 67-68. 
139 The 2009 statement ‘conspicuously’ did not cite any of the sources (laws, regulations) supporting the broad 
assertions about the regulatory regime in place. Furthermore, it made no distinction between the 1997 and 
2002 regimes, which clearly differed. Id. at 46. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 47. 
142 Id. at 15-16, 46. 
143 Id. at 47. 
144 WTO Panel Report, China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, 
WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, adopted Jul. 5, 2011, 7.1096. See infra notes 170-176 and the accompanying 
text. 
145 Vitamin C Ib, see supra note 123, at 58-60. 
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Furthermore, even if the 2002 regime and the related regulations introduced the 
minimum price requirement coupled with sanctions for non-compliance, the court was 
not convinced that the authorities would interfere if the price and output levels were set 
at the point allowing avoiding anti-dumping actions and below-cost pricing.146 It noted 
that setting the prices above that level exceeded the scope of any compulsion and 
would not be immunised.147 
While Vitamin C was ongoing two similar antitrust cases were brought in the US courts 
against Chinese export cartels: Animal Science148 and Resco.149 In Animal Science the 
plaintiffs, US companies, brought a class action against a number of Chinese exporters 
of magnesite-based products for alleged price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. 
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the complaint, inter alia on the foreign 
state compulsion defence basis.150 
Discussing more generally the characteristics of compulsion, the district court ‘distilled’ 
from Mannington a three-points test whereby the defendant invoking compulsion should 
show:151 (a) the existence of an entity in the defendant’s state qualifying as an arm of 
the state by enjoying governmental or quasi-governmental powers that are ‘either 
uniquely peculiar to sovereigns or of essentially sovereign nature’, (b) a direct link 
between the entity’s powers and the defendant, allowing the entity to compel the 
defendant, subject to a significant negative repercussions for non-compliance, and (c) 
the compulsion is the fundamental force causing the defendant’s act, challenged as a 
violation of US law. Moreover, the court noted that the compulsion does not have to 
stem from a black-letter law, underlining that a formal law as such is not a condition 
sine qua non of the compulsion.152 Furthermore, it pointed out that the ‘non-compulsory 
connotations to an American ear’ of the literal translation of foreign government 
directions should not automatically qualify them as non-mandatory.153 Besides, the 
court underlined that defendants’ participation in the ‘coining’ of the governmental 
prescript, does not exempt them from compulsion. Therefore, in principle, it confirmed 
availability of the defence even if a party participated in the creation of the compelling 
act.154 Later the court in Vitamin C explicitly disagreed with this holding.155 
                                                                                                                                         
146 Id. at 60. This was corroborated by the Chinese counsel representations as well as by the Chinese submission 
in the WTO proceedings. Id. at 61-62, referring to Panel Report, see supra note 144, at 7.998. 
147 Vitamin C Ib, see supra note 123, at 60. 
148 Animal Science Products v China Nat. Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp. (Animal Science), 702 F. Supp. 2d 
320 (D.N.J. 2010). 
149 Resco Products v Bosai Minerals Group, 2010-1 Trade Cases P 77,061 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
150 The action was brought in 2005. Within the first two years the litigation concerned issues relating to the 
service of process. In 2008 the further proceedings took place. The complaint was repleaded, leading to the 
discussed court’s opinion on the motions to dismiss. 
151 Animal Science, see supra note 148, at 394. 
152 Therefore parting from the position of the Restatement, following perhaps the implicit approach of the 1995 
Guidelines. Compare supra notes 24-31 and the accompanying text. 
153 Animal Science, see supra note 148, at 425. 
154 Id. at 424-25, 38. 
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In Animal Science the court also addressed the issue of the weight of a foreign 
government submission.156 It considered that a foreign state’s brief warrants a high, 
‘nearly binding’ degree of deference157 and in the instant case it decided to treat the 
Chinese authorities interpretations as ‘the final authority unless the Courts detect a 
Chinese legal provision or an alternative [ministry’s] statement that clearly and 
convincingly establishes the incorrectness of these interpretations.’158 
In the instant case the court faced a very similar problem to the one in Vitamin C. The 
relevant Chamber of Commerce, empowered to administer the export licenses, was 
involved in setting the minimum prices for the exported products. Having analysed the 
evidence the court reached a conclusion that the Chamber was a ‘governmental 
appendage’.159 It found also the existence of sufficiently severe possible punishment for 
non-compliance.160 It noted, distinguishing the case from Texaco Maracaibo, that the 
government compulsion lasted for a long time and was achieved not by a particular act, 
but was rather created by a legal regime, employing ‘various regulatory mechanisms 
producing a composite effect of a never-ceasing correlation between the minimum 
price requirement and punitive measures for non-compliance with it’.161 In effect the 
court found that the Chinese authorities compelled the companies, forcing upon them 
‘a’ minimum price.162 
This said, two issues remained unresolved. Firstly, the price figures are to be 
established. If they were never set, or set but left unknown to the defendants and to the 
authorities enforcing the minimum price requirement, then from the practical 
perspective there are to be treated as equal to zero,163 and any agreement to comply 
with a price above it is to be considered a private agreement, outside the scope of the 
state compulsion. Secondly, if the prices were set and known to the defendants, it is 
conceivable that the companies entered into supra-minimum price agreements. If so, 
such agreements, added on top of the compelled anticompetitive conduct, could be 
illegal under US antitrust rules, regardless of the authorities position in terms of their 
enforcement.164 The complaint was dismissed as the court found that the plaintiffs 
failed to establish court subject-matter jurisdiction, but leave to amend the complaint 
                                                                                                                                         
155 See supra text accompanying notes 130-131. 
156 The issue concerned the amicus brief submitted in the Vitamin C case. 
157 Animal Science, see supra note 148, at 426. 
158 Id. at 429. 
159 Id. at 437. 
160 Id. at 441. 
161 Id. at 449. 
162 Id. at 462. 
163 The court established that ‘a’ price was compelled by the Chinese government. Two options remained: (1) 
the actual price (‘the’ price) could have never been set, or (2) it was set, but the defendants were never 
informed about it. In any of the scenarios, an agreement among defendants fixing price on any level would 
not allow them to rely on the defence. Id. 
164 Id. at 462-63. 
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was granted.165 The plaintiffs declined this invitation and appealed. The Third Circuit 
vacated the district court decision on jurisdictional issues and the case was remanded 
for further proceedings on merits.166 
In Animal Science the district court took a much more elaborate approach compared to 
Vitamin C, being much more sensitive to the peculiarities of the Chinese system, and 
the role of formal law in it. This development could bring more in-depth understanding 
of the Chinese regulatory framework as such, leading to a more just and consistent 
application of US law in such cases. It remains to be seen how the court addresses the 
issue of foreign sovereign compulsion on remand, especially in light of the intervening 
opinion in Vitamin C. Although in the latter case no compulsion was found, the court 
envisaged the possibility of the Chinese authorities compelling a minimum price at the 
level preventing foreign anti-dumping actions, and underlining that an agreement on a 
price above that level would move the agreement outside the realm of the defence.167 It 
may well be that the court in Animal Science reaches such a conclusion in its future 
evaluation of the matter, as it was one of the scenarios it indicated.168 
The issue of foreign government compulsion was also raised in Resco,169 where a US 
company sued Chinese bauxite exporters for their alleged price-fixing in violation of 
the Sherman Act, in a similar context to the one in Vitamin C and Animal Science. 
Likewise, the foreign state compulsion doctrine was the pivot of the defence. In June 
2010 the court decided to stay the proceedings in the anticipation of the outcome of 
the WTO trade dispute brought by the US against China, concerning export restrictions 
on various raw materials, including bauxite. The US raised, inter also, the issue of price 
requirements,170 contending that these were Chinese government actions. While the 
outcomes of the WTO disputes are not binding upon US courts, the findings of the 
WTO panel may be helpful.  
                                                                                                                                         
165 The complaint was dismissed with prejudice with regard to the claims based on the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (FTAIA) ‘effects’ exception (the plaintiffs did not meet the ‘jurisdictional bar’ requiring 
the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on US commerce), but without prejudice to claims 
invoking court jurisdiction under the introductory clause of the FTAIA (making the FTAIA ‘jurisdictional 
bar’ inapplicable in cases where defendants are importers). Id. at 362-63, 83.  
166 The Third Circuit held that the FTAIA does not impose a jurisdictional bar (referring to adjudicative 
jurisdiction, ergo jurisdiction of the courts), but rather a substantive merit limitation. Animal Science Products v 
China Nat. Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp., 2011-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P77,566 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 146-147. 
168 See supra text accompanying note 164. 
169 Resco, see supra note 149. 
170 ‘China also imposes quantitative restrictions on the exportation of the materials by requiring that prices for 
the materials meet or exceed a minimum price before they may be exported. Further, through its ministries 
and other organizations under the State Council as well as chambers of commerce and industry associations, 
China administers the price requirements in a manner that restricts exports and is not uniform, impartial, and 
reasonable.’ China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials. Request for the Establishment of a 
Panel by the United States, WT/DS394/7, 6 (Nov. 9, 2009). In December 2009 a single panel was established to 
examine the US complaint together with similar complaints brought against China by the EU and Mexico. 
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The panel found only six measures related to the minimum export price (MEP) 
requirement within its frame of reference, including charters or regulations of chambers 
of commerce which were referred to in Vitamin C.171 The complainants argued that 
MEPs were enforced through a system of ‘self-discipline’ under the threat of penalties 
(imposed both on non-conforming exporters and on bodies granting licenses to non-
conforming exporters).172 It directed the panel’s attention to proceedings in Vitamin C, 
Animal Science, and Resco and cited the Chinese amicus submission in Vitamin C 
establishing the state compulsion.173 The panel found the measures at stake attributable 
to China174 and challengeable under Article XI:I GATT.175 Ultimately China was found 
in violation of its WTO obligations.176 Interestingly, as already noted177 the court in 
Vitamin C, which found no involvement of foreign state compulsion, expressly did not 
consider its interpretations of the Chinese law affected by the panel’s findings. 
China appealed the panel’s findings.178 The Appellate Body, after some delay,179 
recently delivered its report.180 It found that the panel erred in finding that the section 
III of the complainants’ panel requests, which dealt with the minimal price 
requirements, complied with requirements of Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.181 In the Appellate Body’s view the requests, in the section III, did not 
                                                                                                                                         
171 Panel Report, see supra note 144, at 7.991, 7.995, 7.1001.  
172 Id. at 7.997. 
173 Id. at 7.1002, n. 1419. 
174 Id. at 7.1006. 
175 Id. at 7.1074. 
176 The panel considered the authority to determine the export prices and require exporters to adhere to them, 
under the thread of strict penalties or export license revocation, as potentially trade restrictive and found ‘the 
very potential to limit trade’ [emphasis in the original] sufficient to constitute a restriction prohibited under 
Article XI:1. Id. at 7.1081-7.1082. Article XI:1 of GATT: ‘No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, 
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, 
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party.’ 
177 See supra notes 144-147 and the accompanying text. 
178 China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials. Notification of an Appeal by China under Article 
16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under 
Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/DS394/11, WT/DS395/11, WT/DS398/10 (Sept. 
2, 2011), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/na/ds398-10%28na%29.pdf. 
179 The report of the Appellate Body should be circulated within 60-90 days from the date when the appeal was 
notified. See Art. 17:5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. As China appealed on Aug. 31, the report 
was to be expected in Nov. 2011, yet due to the complexity of the matters involved, the Appellate Body 
informed that the report would be circulated by Jan. 31, 2012. Compare WTO Appellate Body, China- 
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/13, WT/DS395/13, WT/DS398/12 (8 
December, 2011). 
180 WTO Appellate Body Report, China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted Jan. 30, 2012. 
181 Art. 6.2 of the DSU provides: ‘The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall 
indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal 
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly [emphasis added]. In case the applicant requests the 
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‘provide sufficiently clear linkages between the broad range of obligations [referred to 
by the complainants] and the 37 challenged measures.’182 Consequently, the panel’s 
findings regarding claims identified under section III of the requests, including these 
concerning minimum price requirements, were declared ‘moot and of no legal effect’.183 
It is rather unfortunate that the panel requests did not meet the DSU procedural 
requirements. This dispute was a rare opportunity to clarify the scope of the 
applicability of the WTO regime to cases involving state compulsion in particular and 
public cartels in general. While the Appellate Body report did not rule out such 
possibility, it brought us back to square one, with the substantive arguments in favour 
of such interpretation remaining valid and perhaps even somewhat reinforced by the 
panel’s analysis, which although having no legal effect indicates how panellists could 
apply the WTO rules in similar circumstances. That said, the parties’ submissions in this 
case will clearly prove useful in the final resolution of the antitrust actions pending in 
the US. 
The recent antitrust cases show that the foreign state compulsion doctrine requires 
further clarification. The divergent views of the courts point out to the lacking clarity 
with regard to the applicable test. The problems of addressing the Chinese regulatory 
system suggest that the benchmark is perhaps set too high, further contributing to the 
rather poor predictability of the doctrine as a legal tool. The analysis employed in the 
panel report in the related trade dispute allows hope that the issue of state compulsion 
will be better addressed in the multilateral framework, which may be more attuned to 
significant regulatory differences. If state compulsion could be addressed in the trade 
framework, and if the courts in antitrust cases would align their opinions respectively, 
we could actually see a liability gap closed: in cases where reliance on the defence is 
unsuccessful, the liability would remain with the defendants; in cases where the reliance 
is successful, a government could be lobbied to seek a resolution at the multilateral 
level, benefiting from the binding nature of the WTO dispute settlement system. That 
said, one should keep in mind that remedies in both cases would be different, as no 
damages can be awarded in a trade dispute. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The foreign state compulsion doctrine remains important in competition law. 
Depending on the system it can be seen as a defence on merits (as in the US) or as a 
jurisdictional rule excluding the anticompetitive conduct from the applicability of 
substantive antitrust provisions (like in the EU). In either case it has the power to 
potentially fully free the defendants subject to state compulsion from liability, although 
the issue of the scope of the defence (limiting v. ousting liability) remains open. 
Fairness considerations offer strong underpinnings for the doctrine. 
                                                                                                                                         
establishment of a panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the 
proposed text of special terms of reference.’ 
182 Id. at 234-35. 
183 Id. at 235. 
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At the same time both in the US and in the EU reliance on the defence is hardly ever 
successful. The standard of what constitutes compulsion seems to be set too high. This 
is particularly visible in cases arising across different economic systems, like the recent 
Chinese export cartels challenged in the US, or the earlier US-Japanese friction. It is 
one thing to ask the court to address state involvement in a foreign but broadly similar 
system and a very different exercise to ask the judge to do the same in a legal and socio-
economic context poles apart. The recent cases illustrate that different courts, even 
within the same jurisdiction, may take diverse approaches, leading to less predictability 
and potentially to international controversy.  
It is telling that in the EU regime such transnational cases possibly involving foreign 
(non-EU) state compulsion are lacking. Although it may be explained in various ways, 
the lack of treble damages in private enforcement in the EU being probably one of the 
crucial arguments, it demonstrates that the European Commission is reluctant to 
address such concerns, involving foreign states, through extraterritoriality in 
competition law. The fact that Vitamin C, Animal Science and Resco are all private actions, 
and that the US administration brought its own case not against the companies for 
breach of antitrust, but against China in the WTO framework, raising inter alia issues 
being at the centre of the antitrust actions, shows that the US administration opted for 
multilateral means of addressing antitrust concerns. This is a welcome development, 
strengthening the international regulatory system. It supports an argument that antitrust 
concerns involving foreign state compulsion could be challenged under the WTO 
regime. From this perspective, it is disappointing that the Appellate Body in its report 
in China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials did not provide 
guidance on the matter. Was the trade regime found applicable in such cases, the 
standard of foreign state compulsion in antitrust cases should be lowered, possibly to 
the level comparable to the one applicable to the US domestic state action doctrine. 
Such a step would offer more clarity in terms of who is liable in such context under 
antitrust laws, leading also to fewer controversies across jurisdictions. Otherwise, if 
multilateral means of addressing this issue do not present themselves in a foreseeable 
perspective and the reliance on the compulsion defence will not be successful in a 
number of similar cases, the international tension is bound to grow. In any case, the 
foreign state compulsion defence was recognised for a good reason and courts and 
competition authorities should not, by pushing the standard too high, rule it out, 
especially when the claims arise in a wider context on the verge of international trade 
and competition. 
